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2
Social Security and Pension





Retirement income systems are in a state of change. Increasing lon-
gevity and declining birth rates cause population aging and put pressure 
on retirement income fi nancing. For this reason, countries around the 
world are reforming their retirement income systems of pensions and 
social security old-age benefi ts. Changing views about the provision of 
retirement income and innovations in program design are also infl uenc-
ing the trends.
This chapter surveys trends in social security and pension pro-
grams around the world. It fi rst discusses social security reforms and 
mandatory individual account programs, and then discusses reforms of 
employer-provided pension plans.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MANDATORY INDIVIDUAL 
ACCOUNT PROGRAMS
Social security programs and mandatory individual account 
programs are considered together as part of government mandated pro-
vision for retirement. 
Raising Retirement Ages
With people living longer in many parts of the world, the cost 
of providing social security and pension benefi ts in traditional pen-
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sion systems is increasing because those benefi ts are being provided 
for more years. To offset this cost increase, many countries in Europe, 
Eastern Europe, and elsewhere have legislated increases in the early 
retirement age for social security benefi ts, sometimes called the eligi-
bility age or minimum age for retirement. That is the earliest age at 
which social security retirement benefi ts can be received. Often those 
increases are legislated to occur a number of years into the future, or are 
phased in over a number of years. In some countries, changes have also 
occurred in the age at which the worker can receive a full benefi t, but 
those changes are more aptly described as changes in benefi t generosity, 
rather than changes in retirement ages.
Japan is raising the eligibility age for both of its social security 
programs (Rajnes 2007). Japan passed legislation in 1995 that raised 
the eligibility age for its fl at rate pension (National Pension) by one 
year every three years, with it increasing from age 60 to 61 in 2001 
and reaching 65 in 2014. Based on legislation passed in 2000, Japan is 
raising the eligibility age for its earnings-related pension (Employees’ 
Pension Insurance) by one year every three years starting in 2013. With 
these changes, men born after 1960 and women born after 1965 have a 
retirement age for both programs of 65 by 2025 for men and 2030 for 
women. 
New Zealand raised its eligibility age from 60 in 1991 to 65 in 2001. 
Those workers who turned 60 before March 31, 1992, were eligible for 
a social security benefi t at age 60. The legislation, which passed August 
1, 1991, took effect the following April, when eligibility increased from 
age 60 to 61. Beginning July 1, 1993, eligibility rose by three months 
for each six-month period until April 1, 2001, when the eligibility age 
reached 65. Thus, a fi ve-year increase in the eligibility age phased in 
over nine years. A Transitional Retirement Benefi t was paid over this 
period to those affected by the changes, with the age of eligibility for 
this benefi t also rising until it was phased out on April 1, 2001.
Some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries have had a longstanding eligibility age of 65, and 
some are raising the eligibility age even higher. In Australia, Austria, 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the eligibility age for 
men has been 65 since at least 1949. In 2012, the Netherlands passed a 
law that will raise the retirement age in 2020 from 65 to 66. In Ireland, 
starting in 2014, the age of entitlement for social security benefi ts will 
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be raised from 65 to 66. In Australia, it will be gradually rising to 67 
from 2017 to 2023 for both men and women.
Some countries have had a higher eligibility age in social security 
in the past than they do currently. In 1913, when social security was 
introduced in Sweden, the eligibility age was 67 (Lindquist and Waden-
sjö, this volume). The eligibility age in the United States was 65 in 1940 
but now is 62.
In Central and Eastern Europe, a number of countries—Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and Poland—
are increasing their retirement eligibility ages as a move toward insuring 
the solvency of their social security systems. In 2012, Latvia enacted 
legislation raising the eligibility age for social security benefi ts from 
62 to 65, rising by three months a year, and reaching 65 in 2025 (U.S. 
Social Security Administration 2012).
Some low-income countries in Africa retain low benefi t eligibility 
ages for social security benefi ts. For example, the early retirement age 
is 50 in Swaziland. However, some high-income countries also have 
low eligibility ages. In Kuwait, the retirement age is 50, but it is increas-
ing to 55 by 2020.
Equalizing Benefi t Eligibility Ages for Men and Women
Many countries historically have had lower early retirement ages 
for women than for men. However, many of these countries have 
equalized the ages for men and women by raising over time the early 
retirement age of women so that it reaches the level for men. China, 
Cuba, Vietnam, and the former communist country of Russia are among 
the countries that maintain lower early retirement ages for women than 
men.
Changes to Encourage Later Retirement
Many countries have enacted changes other than increases in early 
retirement ages to encourage later retirement. Among OECD countries, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Po-
land, and Spain have enacted tighter requirements to qualify for early 
retirement benefi ts (Whitehouse and Antolin 2012). In Canada in 2012, 
an earlier enacted change took effect, raising benefi ts for workers who 
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postpone taking benefi ts past age 65, cutting them for workers who retire 
before age 65, and introducing a new benefi t for workers who are still 
working. Bulgaria in 2012 also raised benefi ts for workers postponing 
retirement. In 2012, Denmark scaled back its government-subsidized 
program providing early retirement benefi ts. Sweden has instituted in-
come tax credits for workers aged 65 and older. Portugal has reduced 
social security contributions for workers aged 65 and older. France has 
increased the actuarial reduction of benefi ts for early retirement. In Ke-
nya, pension benefi ts received at age 65 or older are tax free, in order to 
encourage postponement of receipt of those benefi ts.
In raising the retirement age, one option is to provide for early re-
tirement for workers who have worked for many years. Some countries 
with special early retirement benefi ts have raised the number of years 
required to be eligible for those benefi ts. France has raised the number 
of years from 37.5 to 40, while Belgium has raised the number of years 
from 20 to 35 (U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce 2005).
In 2011, Spain passed a law that increased incentives for older 
workers to remain in the labor force. An innovative aspect of this re-
form is that the incentives are greater for workers with more years of 
service. For workers with less than 25 years of service, for every year 
an individual continues working beyond the full retirement age, the in-
centive will remain at 2 percent; from 25 to 36 years, 2.75 percent; and 
37 or more years, 4 percent. Some countries encourage work at older 
ages by reducing the social security contribution rate. In Portugal, the 
rate the employee pays has dropped from 11 percent to 8 percent since 
2009. 
Retrenchment in Traditional Social Security Programs
A number of countries have cut back on the generosity of their so-
cial security benefi ts, resulting in falling income replacement rates in 
old age. These countries include France, Japan, Sweden, Greece, South 
Korea, and the United States. Among OECD countries, cutbacks in 
benefi t generosity have typically reduced future benefi ts between one-
fi fth and one-quarter (Whitehoues and Antolin 2012). 
Sometimes the cutback is expressed in another way, perhaps to re-
duce the political reaction to the change. For example, one way to cut 
benefi ts is to postpone access to full benefi ts to a later age, coupled 
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with actuarial reductions in benefi ts received at an earlier age. This ap-
proach has been used by Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the 
United States. The United States has reduced benefi ts at the eligibility 
age by raising the Normal Retirement Age from 65 to 67 over the period 
2000–2022. 
Many countries have reduced benefi ts in traditional social insurance 
old-age benefi ts programs by increasing the years used in the earnings 
averaging period for calculating benefi ts. Spain has done so, result-
ing in more years of relatively low earnings being included, lowering 
average earnings in the benefi t calculation. Finland, Austria, France, 
Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom have also increased the num-
ber of years used in benefi t calculation. In Italy, the increase was from 
the worker’s last fi ve years of earnings to lifetime earnings. Portugal 
increased the number of years from 10 years to all years of work. How-
ever, it also defi ned a transitional period, from 2002 to 2016, during 
which the most favorable method of calculation—the former, the latter, 
or a weighted average of both—could be applied in order to guarantee 
benefi ciaries the most favorable rule to determine the pension level. In 
2007, it subsequently passed a law that shortened the transitional period 
(See Murteira, this volume).
Benefi ts can be reduced by changing the calculation of cost-of-
living adjustments. Germany and Japan have both moved from basing 
postretirement benefi t adjustments on the growth of net wages rather 
than gross wages. With the growth of taxes and social security contri-
bution rates, net wages grow less rapidly than gross wages. Reductions 
in cost-of-living adjustments reduce benefi ts more at older ages than at 
younger ages because for each retiree, the effect of the cuts is cumula-
tive over the time period since retirement.
Countries with traditional benefi t formulas have a parameter in 
those formulas that determines the generosity of the rate at which future 
benefi ts accrue with additional work. Japan, Norway, and Portugal have 
cut future benefi ts by reducing the benefi t accrual rate in the benefi t for-
mula. For example, Japan cut the accrual rate from 1 percent per year of 
work to 0.7125 percent (U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce 2005). 
Austria has reduced the accrual rates used to calculate the initial benefi t 
from an annual rate of 2 percent to 1.78 percent starting in 2009. 
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Benefi t Reductions That Affect Current Retirees
Traditionally, social security benefi t cuts have been targeted so that 
they did not affect people who were already receiving benefi ts because 
those people were considered to be particularly vulnerable. Because of 
their age, for many returning to work to offset the benefi t cuts was not 
an option. That policy of protecting current benefi ciaries has changed 
in some countries. 
In most countries, benefi ts in payment are indexed so that they at 
least keep pace with the rate of infl ation and thus maintain their real 
(infl ation-corrected) value during retirement. Greece and Norway have 
cut benefi ts by reducing the indexing of benefi ts in payment. Sweden’s 
automatic adjustment mechanism can involve a reduction in indexing 
of benefi ts in payment so that it is less than the rate of infl ation. 
Increasing Contribution Rates
Some countries have raised contribution rates, particularly countries 
that have relatively low contribution rates, but increases are not limited 
to those countries. Kenya is an example (Turner, this volume). Contri-
bution rates have been increased in many OECD countries, including 
Denmark, Finland, France, and Sweden. They have also increased in 
some countries with mandatory individual accounts and mandatory 
pensions, such as Mexico, Singapore, and Australia. Australia is raising 
further its contribution rate for its mandatory pension system from 9 
percent to 12 percent (Clare, this volume).
Increasing the Contribution Base
Social security contributions can be increased by raising the con-
tribution base rather than raising the contribution rate. Countries that 
have completely eliminated the ceiling on taxable earnings for social 
security fi nancing include Finland and Norway. In 2001, Ireland elimi-
nated the ceiling on taxable earnings for social security for employer 
contributions. The United Kingdom also requires employers to pay 
social security taxes on employee earnings without a ceiling on those 
earnings. Some countries have expanded the range of earnings included 
in taxable earnings. Japan, for example, included the twice-yearly bo-
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nuses in taxable earnings. France, in addition to raising the contribution 
rate, increased the contribution base to include employer contributions 
to occupational pension plans.
New Revenue Sources
Some countries have decided that they cannot raise the payroll tax 
any further. For example, Japan has been concerned about the effects 
of increases in the payroll tax, which would raise labor costs, on the in-
ternational competitiveness of its workforce. By comparison, however, 
China, which has large trade surpluses, has a social security tax rate that 
varies across provinces but averages 28 percent (Chen and Turner, this 
volume), substantially higher than in Japan.
In 2012, Japan legislated an increase of its value added tax (VAT) 
from 5 to 10 percent, starting in 2014, with the increased revenue being 
used to fi nance its social security program. Although all OECD coun-
tries use contributions from employers and employees to fi nance social 
security old age benefi ts, nearly all those countries also use general rev-
enue funding. France has levied a tax of 1 percent on all income that 
is dedicated to fi nancing old-age benefi ts (U.S. Government Account-
ability Offi ce 2005). More recently, Portugal in 2012 levied a tax on 
pensions of more than 1,500 euros per month. 
Unifi cation of National Social Security Systems
When social security systems were started they often excluded 
certain groups, such as government workers, workers in particular in-
dustries that already had good pensions, or workers in industries with 
low wages, such as agriculture. Some countries developed multiple 
pension systems to cover different workers. Reforms in the United 
States, Chile, Nigeria, and Greece have expanded the coverage of na-
tional social security systems to include more groups of workers, in 
the process unifying. Part of this movement has been a trend to include 
government workers in the national social security program. Thailand 
is currently phasing out some special programs for government work-
ers. In 2011, China established a national unifi ed social security system 
for urban workers, which facilitates workers moving between different 
parts of the country (Chen and Turner, this volume). In Africa, Cape 
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Verde, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia have all consolidated 
their social security programs for formal sector workers (Republic of 
Kenya 2012).
Ending Provident Funds
Provident funds are defi ned contribution plans that typically pro-
vide lump sum benefi ts and have a single investment pool for all 
participants. These types of plans were established in many countries 
that were formerly British colonies or British protectorates, in part be-
cause of their simplicity. Provident funds were established in most of 
the former British colonies or protectorates in Africa—Gambia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zam-
bia. Swaziland retains such a plan; however, many countries, including 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania, have ended those plans and switched 
to social insurance types of plans. Kenya and Uganda in 2012 were 
considering converting their provident funds to defi ned contribution 
pensions, rather than to a defi ned benefi t social insurance pension 
(Turner, this volume). Nigeria subsequently switched to a mandatory 
individual account system. In the Caribbean, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are among countries 
that converted a provident fund to a traditional defi ned benefi t social 
security program (Gillion et al. 2000). 
Social Security Privatization with Mandatory Funded
Individual Accounts
Most countries provide social security benefi ts through traditional 
defi ned benefi t pay-as-you-go systems (PAYG) based on principles of 
social insurance. However, many countries in Latin America, Central 
and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere have added mandatory individual 
accounts as a component of their social security programs. One of the 
motivations for social security privatization was the belief that this 
innovation would lead to a closer connection between contributions 
and benefi ts, which would lead to less distortion of incentives in labor 
markets.
In 1981, Chile was the fi rst country to privatize its social security 
program with mandatory individual accounts. Chile completely ended 
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its PAYG system for private sector workers, replacing it with an in-
dividual account system, while most other countries that followed it 
cut back on the PAYG system and combined it with a mandatory indi-
vidual account system. Since 1990, 10 other countries in Latin America 
have followed Chile (Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha 2011). The fi rst coun-
tries following Chile to switch to individual accounts (with the year 
implemented) were Peru (1993), Colombia (1993), Argentina (1994), 
Uruguay (1996), and Mexico (1997). These were followed by two of 
the poorest countries in the region, Bolivia (1997) and El Salvador 
(1998). In 2008, Panama added mandatory individual accounts as part 
of social security for new entrants into the social security system. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union, 
a number of countries that were part of the Soviet Union or that were 
in Central and Eastern Europe added mandatory individual accounts 
as part of their social security systems. Kazakhstan (1997), Hungary 
(1998), and Poland (1999) were early leaders, but they were followed 
by Bulgaria (2000), Latvia (2001), Croatia (2002), and Estonia (2002) 
(Szczepański and Brzęczek, this volume). Other countries include 
Bulgaria (2002), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003), 
Slovakia (2005), and Romania (2008) (Żukowski, this volume). In 
addition, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Russia have en-
acted reforms. 
Mandatory defi ned contribution plans have also been introduced in 
countries in other regions, either in addition to or in replacement of ex-
isting traditional social security programs. In 2011, Thailand introduced 
the National Pension Fund as a mandatory defi ned contribution plan to 
supplement its traditional social security plan. In 2010, Egypt passed a 
law replacing its PAYG system with a system of mandatory individual 
accounts. In 2010, Brunei added mandatory individual accounts to its 
existing mandatory social security system. Between 1988 and 2008, 29 
countries followed Chile and established a funded fi rst pillar social se-
curity system (Holzmann 2012).
Retrenchment on Privatization
Some countries that enacted reforms privatizing social security 
by adding individual accounts have later cut back on those reforms, 
reducing or eliminating the contributions to privatized individual ac-
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counts. Argentina ended its system of privatized individual accounts in 
2008, while Bolivia nationalized its system of individual accounts in 
late 2010. Retrenchment has been more common in Central and Eastern 
Europe than in South America, in part because of the fi nancial crisis 
there and the subsequent economic downturn. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia 
all retrenched their privatized systems in some way since 2010 (Fultz 
2012). Starting in 2010, Hungary ceased funding for its second-tier pro-
gram and returned most of the accumulated funds to the participants. 
Retrenchment has occurred in part because of the double payment 
problem, where payments are being made into the new individual ac-
counts, while payments are still required into the traditional PAYG 
system to pay the benefi ts promised from that system. Some govern-
ments have found that it was too expensive to pay for the existing PAYG 
system and for the new individual accounts, particularly in an economic 
downturn. In 2012, the Slovak Republic reduced the contributions to 
the mandatory individual accounts and transferred those contributions 
to the PAYG system. It also temporarily permitted workers to withdraw 
from the system.
In 1997, China established a multipillar reform, adding funded in-
dividual accounts to a PAYG system. However, it later decided not to 
fully fund those accounts, taking some of the money originally des-
ignated for the individual accounts and using it to fi nance the PAYG 
benefi ts. Those accounts now are more like notional accounts, with an 
unfunded liability arising due to their total liabilities exceeding their 
total assets (Chen and Turner, this volume).
 It was initially thought that competition among service providers 
would reduce high fees in mandatory individual account systems, but 
that has not proved to be the case. The reason may be that participants 
are not sensitive to fees when choosing among service providers, per-
haps because they do not understand how much fees can reduce future 
account balances.
Chile and Mexico have taken steps to reduce fees. In Chile, every 
two years a bidding process determines the lowest-fee pension fund 
provider. All new entrants must use that provider. Mexico has taken 
steps to increase competition among pension fund providers as a way 
to reduce fees. The United Kingdom has limited the maximum fees that 
can be charged on stakeholder pensions, which are a form of voluntary 
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individual account pension. Australia has introduced a low-cost fund as 
an alternative in its mandatory employer-provided pension system. The 
United States and the United Kingdom have taken steps to have more 
disclosure of fee information to pension participants.
Defaults to Deal with Decision-Making Problems
Defaults have been used in mandatory individual account systems 
for workers who do not wish to make an investment choice. For ex-
ample, in the Swedish Premium Pension system, which is a mandatory 
individual account system, if a worker fails to choose an investment, the 
worker is placed in the default investment. In 2010, Sweden changed 
that default so that the risk of the portfolio varies by the age of the par-
ticipant, with the percent invested in low-risk assets increasing as the 
participant ages. In Australia in the mandatory pension fund system, if 
an employer does not wish to choose a pension fund for its employees, 
it can use the default fund for employers in its industry. In New Zea-
land in the KiwiSaver program, workers who do not choose a pension 
provider are automatically enrolled in the employer’s preferred plan, 
but if the employer has not chosen a plan they are randomly assigned 
to one of six default plans. In Peru, recent reform measures encourage 
more competition among AFPs (Pension Fund Associations) by assign-
ing new labor force entrants to the AFP with the lowest administrative 
fee. From October through December 2012, all new entrants to the sys-
tem of individual accounts were assigned to Prima, the pension fund 
management company (AFP) that offered the lowest administrative fee 
in the tender held in September.
Raising Limits on International Investments
Some countries have raised the limits on international investments 
allowed both for mandatory pension plans and for voluntary pension 
plans. A few countries have no limits on these investments. In 2008, 
Uruguay raised from 0 to 15 percent the limit on international invest-
ments in its mandatory individual account system, and Colombia raised 
its limit to 40 percent. In 2009, Brazil raised to 10 percent the limits 
on international investments for certain pension funds provided volun-
tarily by employers. In 2010 and 2011, Chile raised the limits on the 
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percentage of a pension fund’s assets in its mandatory system that can 
be invested in international investments, with the limit reaching 80 per-
cent in 2011. Peru raised the limit in its mandatory system to 30 percent 
in 2010. In Sweden in mandatory individual accounts, and in the United 
States in voluntary individual account defi ned contribution plans, indi-
viduals can invest entirely in international investments.
Notional Account Plans
In notional account or notional defi ned contribution systems (or 
nonfi nancial defi ned contribution systems), each worker has an account, 
but the account is not fully funded, generally only having limited fund-
ing. Rather, it has a notional or accounting value for each participant. 
This system is essentially a PAYG system, though there may also be a 
reserve fund. A notional rate of return is assigned to each account. One 
of the motivations for this type of plan is that it attempts to make a closer 
connection between contributions and benefi ts, based on the view that 
such a connection may encourage workers to view the contribution not 
as a tax but as a payment for a future benefi t. When Sweden reformed 
its social security system by enacting a notional account system, it ex-
tended the years taken into account in calculating benefi ts from 15 years 
to all years of work (Lindquist and Wadensjö, this volume).
Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Norway, and Italy—a diverse set of coun-
tries—have adopted this type of system. Egypt adopted this type of 
system in 2010, with implementation expected in 2013 (Holzmann 
2012). 
Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms
At least 12 countries have adopted automatic adjustment mecha-
nisms as a way to maintain the solvency of their PAYG social security 
programs. In 1998, Brazil adopted life expectancy indexing of its so-
cial security benefi ts for private sector workers. At retirement age, the 
calculation of social security benefi ts takes into account the average 
life expectancy for the population at that age, with an annual updat-
ing of life expectancy at retirement age. Life expectancy is offi cially 
estimated by the annual household survey of the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics. 
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Finland, Portugal, and Norway adjust the generosity of benefi ts 
received at retirement automatically for changes in life expectancy. 
Portugal passed legislation in 2007, introducing a sustainability coef-
fi cient in the benefi t formula for calculating pensions. This coeffi cient 
equals the ratio between life expectancy in 2006 and life expectancy in 
the year preceding retirement. The level of statutory pension is multi-
plied by the coeffi cient, reducing the benefi t level as life expectancy 
increases (Murteira, this volume). The August 2011 pension reform law 
in Spain required that a sustainability factor be introduced to the system 
in 2027 that will adjust the relevant parameters of the system to changes 
in life expectancy every fi ve years.
In Sweden, life expectancy indexing of benefi ts is done by using an 
annuity divisor that refl ects improvements in life expectancy at age 65. 
No further reductions in benefi ts for improvements in mortality occur 
after age 65. Thus, the life expectancy adjustment does not take into 
account life expectancy improvements that occur after age 65. It is ex-
pected that the failure to adjust for life expectancy improvements after 
retirement will be expensive, costing about 1 percent of payroll in contri-
butions (Palmer 2000). The initial generation in the system will benefi t 
from this feature, but subsequent generations will pay for it through the 
automatic adjustment process required to maintain solvency.
In Sweden, mortality experience is averaged over the previous fi ve 
years to avoid year-to-year fl uctuations that do not refl ect longer-term 
trends. The Swedish system uses, as do the other systems, period mor-
tality tables, which are mortality tables based on the experience of the 
cross section of older persons. For each birth cohort in Sweden, the 
annuity divisor adjustment is established at age 65, with a provisional 
adjustment made for retirements starting at age 61, which is the benefi t 
entitlement age. 
In addition to the automatic adjustment of benefi ts for longevity 
improvement, every year the Swedish government tests whether the 
system is in balance. If it falls out of balance, adjustments are auto-
matically made to decrease benefi ts, without the intervention of elected 
government offi cials needing to decide what to do. Thus, automatic ad-
justment mechanisms reduce the political risk that no action will be 
taken until a crisis—rather, actions will be taken automatically, without 
the intervention of politicians.
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In 2012, Greece adopted a pension system with a notional rate of 
return and an automatic adjustment mechanism to maintain solvency. 
Italy, Poland, and Latvia also have automatic life expectancy indexing 
in a notional account system. France in 2003 legislated an increase in 
the number of years of earnings required to receive a full pension from 
40 to 41, rising by one quarter per year from 2009 to 2012. Thereafter,
through 2020, the contribution period for full benefi ts will increase au-
tomatically as needed to keep the ratio of the contribution period to the 
average retirement period equal to its ratio in 2003, which is approxi-
mately two to one. This adjustment mechanism effectively results in 
a reduction in benefi ts that is tied to increases in life expectancy. The 
French government retains the right to not make these adjustments if 
labor market conditions, such as high unemployment, do not support 
the extra years of work.
In 2012, the Netherlands passed a law that will automatically adjust 
its normal retirement age for increases in life expectancy, starting in 
2020. This provides an alternative approach for indexing benefi ts to 
improvements in life expectancy. Every fi ve years, the government will 
assess whether life expectancy improvements have been suffi cient to 
warrant an increase in the retirement age. According to projections, the 
retirement age will increase from 66 to 67 in 2025 and from 67 to 68 in 
2040. Workers will still be able to receive benefi ts at age 65, but these 
changes in the normal retirement age result in a cut in benefi ts at that 
age by 6.5 percent for every one-year increase in the normal retirement 
age. 
Japan, Germany, and Canada have also adopted different types 
of automatic adjustment mechanisms. While in many countries with 
automatic adjustment mechanisms the adjustments occur annually, in 
Canada, because of the stability of its long-term fi nancing, it is expected 
that its automatic adjustment mechanism will be used rarely, if at all.
One issue with these mechanisms has been how automatic they 
actually were in practice, with Sweden, Germany, and Italy making 
changes to the adjustment mechanism when unpopular adjustments 
were required. In 2009, Germany passed a law that for the second con-
secutive year overrode the automatic adjustment mechanism. 
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National Savings Funds for Retirement Financing
Ireland, France, China, and New Zealand have introduced separate 
national savings funds, separate from their social security programs, for 
the purpose of prefi nancing future social security benefi ts. Subsequently, 
however, some of these countries ended up drawing down these funds 
earlier than expected (Whitehouse and Antolin 2012). In Ireland, for 
example, the National Pension Reserve Fund was used to help bail out 
Irish banks in 2011 because of the fi nancial crisis. In 2007, Argentina 
established a national social security sustainability fund to help guar-
antee the payment of future social security benefi ts. In 2008, Russia 
established the National Welfare Fund to help pay for future public 
pension benefi ts. Norway has a large national savings fund, one of the 
largest pension funds in the world (Mosionek-Schweda, this volume).
Extending Coverage to More Workers
The majority of workers around the world, particularly outside of 
the high-income countries, lack social security coverage. This is one 
of the key problems facing social security programs, particularly for 
middle- and lower-income countries. On average, social security pro-
grams in Africa only cover 10 percent of workers (Gillion et al. 2000), 
partly because many workers are employed in the informal sector, which 
many social security programs do not cover. Part of the reason also is 
that many workers who should be covered by law are not participating 
because of contribution evasion, which is the failure of employers and 
workers to make mandatory social security contributions. 
Many countries are attempting to extend coverage to more workers. 
Burundi has an innovative system where motorcycle taxi cab drivers 
are covered through contributions to their national association (Turner, 
this volume). To encourage coverage among agricultural workers, who 
are typically more diffi cult to bring into the social security system, 
Tanzania has a public relations campaign to encourage more people to 
participate in the social security system. Tunisia charges agricultural 
workers a lower contribution rate than urban workers. Egypt allows 
self-employed workers to declare their level of income, with the mini-
mum level varying by occupation. Vietnam has a program that allows 
agricultural workers to make contributions in kilos of rice, and later 
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receive benefi ts in rice. Thailand, China, and India also have a matching 
contribution for voluntary programs for informal sector or rural work-
ers. In 2010, the Indian government introduced a new pension initiative, 
which runs from 2010 through 2014, to increase participation in the 
national New Pension Scheme, aimed particularly at the 300 million 
workers in the unorganized sector who are generally excluded from for-
mal pension provisions. The initiative includes a partial contribution 
match to encourage participation in the plan.
In 2012, Peru enacted a law extending mandatory coverage to self-
employed workers earning more than 1.5 times the minimum wage. 
Chile is also extending coverage of its mandatory individual accounts 
to self-employed workers earning above a minimum amount, but with 
the choice to opt out during a fi ve-year transition period. In 2010, Ma-
laysia extended coverage to part-time workers. That same year, South 
Korea extended coverage of its mandatory employer-sponsored pen-
sion system to small employers having four or fewer employees.
Some countries in Africa have not had social security programs for 
private sector workers, only for workers in government and government-
controlled enterprises. In 2011, Ethiopia extended social security cover-
age to private sector workers.
It was initially thought that individual account systems would suc-
ceed in extending coverage to more workers because of the link between 
contributions and account balances and thus benefi ts. In fact, the link 
is quite variable. It is variable because of fi nancial market risk, which 
affects both the link between contributions and account balances at re-
tirement and the link between account balances and annuitized benefi ts. 
Perhaps for other reasons as well, the extension of coverage in countries 
adopting individual accounts has not occurred. Reforms with individual 
account plans did not increase coverage in any of the reforming coun-
tries in Latin America (Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha 2011).
Some countries have extended coverage to uncovered workers on a 
voluntary basis. China has a voluntary pension system for rural workers 
(Chen and Turner, this volume). Kenya in 2011 launched a voluntary 
individual account system, called the Mbao Pension Plan (Kwena and 
Turner 2013; Turner, this volume), where poor workers can contribute 
small amounts (as little as $0.25) using mobile phone technology. This 
system is feasible because mobile phone costs have decreased to the 
extent that they are available in Kenya for as little as $5 or $10.
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Noncontributory Social Security Pensions
A number of middle- and lower-income countries have established 
noncontributory means-tested old-age pensions to provide benefi ts 
to poor people in old age and to extend the coverage of social secu-
rity programs (International Labour Offi ce 2007). This trend has been 
motivated by an attempt to reduce poverty in old age and appears to 
be gaining greater acceptance around the world. These programs are 
sometimes called social pensions. Countries with social pensions in-
clude Brazil, India, Nepal, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, 
and Mauritius. Swaziland and Lesotho have tax-fi nanced programs that 
provide cash transfers to older persons (Vincent and Cull 2011). Chile 
adopted such a program in 2008, and also established a minimum ben-
efi t for participants who had contributed to the mandatory individual 
accounts and met certain other requirements. In 2008, Belize extended 
to indigent older men its noncontributory poverty program that already 
applied for indigent older women. The Maldives adopted a program in 
2010. Peru and the Philippines both adopted programs in 2011.
International Agreements to Facilitate Work and Retirement in 
Other Countries
Although for many years countries have had international agree-
ments concerning social security benefi ts for workers moving between 
countries, there is an increased interest in global collaboration to pro-
vide these benefi ts. Mercosur—the Southern Common Market—signed 
an agreement in 2007 whereby retirees could receive their social secu-
rity benefi ts in any country in the region without charge. The benefi ts 
are wired from the social security agency in the home country to the 
social security agency in the new country of residence. Formerly, the 
benefi ts were wired to a bank in the residence country, which charged 
money transfer and foreign exchange fees. In addition, all documen-
tation is sent electronically, rather than by mail, which expedites the 
process of workers receiving benefi ts from other countries. In 2007, 
22 countries signed the Ibero-American Multilateral Social Security 
Agreement, which will facilitate the provision of social security bene-
fi ts to international workers in Hispanic countries. In 2011, a new Ibero 
multilateral agreement provides social security benefi ts to migrant 
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workers and their families in eight countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ec-
uador, El Salvador, Spain, Paraguay, and Portugal.
The EU has regulations regarding the coordination of social secu-
rity in EU countries. The East African Community is considering this 
issue (Turner, this volume). As well as these multilateral agreements, 
increasingly countries have bilateral agreements, sometimes called to-
talization agreements. New Zealand and Australia are also discussing 
the portability of pension benefi ts between those two countries as part 
of an effort to move those countries to a single economic market. 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSION PLANS
Unisex Pensions from Defi ned Contribution Plans
Because women on average live longer than men, life insurance 
companies selling annuities generally charge a higher price to women 
than men for an annuity paying an equal annual benefi t. Gender-based 
benefi t calculations when annuitizing defi ned contribution accounts, 
which results in equal expected lifetime benefi ts for men and women 
the same age, is viewed as discriminatory against women by some 
people because it provides lower annual benefi ts to women than men. 
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed gender-based pensions for 
employer-provided defi ned contribution plans on the grounds that it 
constituted discrimination in compensation against women. In 2012, 
the EU outlawed that practice for all annuities, including annuities both 
provided through pension plans and purchased individually. 
Extending Voluntary Pension Coverage
Extending voluntary pension coverage, as a supplement to manda-
tory pension coverage, has long been a goal for many countries. Ireland 
mandated that by 2003 all employers were required to provide their 
employees the option to participate in a Personal Retirement Savings 
Account, but many employers have failed to comply with this require-
ment, and among those that have, some have no participants in the plans 
provided (Hughes, this volume). In 2008, the Philippine Congress passed 
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a law creating private voluntary retirement accounts as a supplement to 
the country’s public PAYG system. Under the law, public- and private-
sector employees and the self-employed may set up Personal Equity 
and Retirement Accounts (PERAs). In 2009, a program took effect in 
Israel through an agreement between labor unions and manufacturing 
associations to extend pension coverage to workers not already having 
such coverage. In 2011, Chile established new rules to encourage em-
ployers to voluntarily provide pension plans. In 2012, India extended a 
defi ned contribution system designed for government workers so as to 
make it available to private sector workers, and Malaysia established a 
voluntary pension system to supplement its mandatory system. 
Some countries, however, provide voluntary pension systems to 
workers who do not participate in social security as a substitute for 
social security. In 2007, Pakistan introduced a new voluntary pen-
sion system. In 2009, China extended voluntary pension coverage to 
650 million rural workers by establishing the National Rural Pension 
Scheme. By 2011, there were more than 258 million contributors and 
100 million benefi ciaries (Turner and Chen, this volume).
Pension Regulators
As employer-provided pensions are increasing, many more coun-
tries gradually are adopting pension regulators. With the growing 
importance of defi ned contribution plans, pension regulators more often 
are not part of Labor Departments but are part of government depart-
ments focusing on fi nancial market regulation. Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania have all instituted pension regulatory authorities. Burundi, 
however, does not have a pension regulator (Turner, this volume).
The Decline in Defi ned Benefi t Plans and the Trend toward
Defi ned Contribution Plans
In countries with established pension systems, defi ned benefi t plans 
were traditionally the primary plans in the private sector but have since 
declined in importance, being supplanted by defi ned contribution plans. 
Generally, the decline has been considerably less in the public sector, 
where defi ned benefi t plans still predominate. These countries include 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, and Kenya. In the 
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United States, a type of defi ned contribution plan called the 401(k) plan 
has replaced defi ned benefi t plans as the most important type of plan 
in the private sector, but Individual Retirement Accounts, which are 
defi ned contribution plans established by individuals without reference 
to a particular employer, have since replaced 401(k) plans as the most 
important type of retirement plan in terms of assets. The decline in pri-
vate sector defi ned benefi t plans has not occurred in all countries where 
they have been prevalent. For example, it has not occurred in Germany 
or Japan. There has also been a movement away from defi ned benefi t 
plans for public sector employees, with Kenya and Brazil taking steps 
to end those plans for public sector employees.
Automatic Enrollment to Extend Coverage
To solve the problem of workers not participating in voluntary 
employer-provided pension plans when they have the opportunity to do 
so, there has been a trend toward automatic enrollment. In traditional 
plans, workers need to actively enroll in employer-provided defi ned 
contribution plans. If they do nothing, they are not enrolled. Thus, tra-
ditionally the default is nonenrollment. 
A number of employers sponsoring defi ned contribution pension 
plans in the United States have adopted automatic enrollment. In the 
KiwiSaver program in New Zealand, starting in 2007, workers are 
placed in the system by default but can opt out. In the United Kingdom, 
starting in October 2012, all employers are required to offer a pension 
plan to their employees, and they are required to automatically enroll 
their employees (Szczepański and Turner, this volume). The require-
ment starts with large fi rms and is being phased in over four years so 
that it will eventually apply to all employers. The mandatory contribu-
tion rate to the plan is 8 percent, also being phased in, with 1 percent of 
that provided by a government subsidy. 
Defaults
Along with automatic enrollment, which is a form of default, de-
faults have been used for investment options. Many participants are 
uncertain as to what a good investment choice would be. With defaults, 
if they take no action they automatically are signed up for the default 
up14msssapch2.indd   32 1/31/2014   10:00:50 AM
Social Security and Pension Trends around the World   33
investment. Initially, in the United States that investment was a low-risk 
option, but there has been a move toward higher-risk defaults because 
low-risk defaults resulted in small accounts due to low returns. The de-
faults now generally being used are ones that reduce the portfolio risk 
as the participant approached retirement. These are sometimes called 
target-date funds, or retirement date funds. 
In 2012, the United Kingdom established a nationwide default, 
known as the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), which pro-
vides retirement date funds for workers whose employers do not offer 
a plan and who do not choose one of the other funds offered by NEST 
(Szczepański and Turner, this volume). This system is largely based on 
the KiwiSaver system in New Zealand.
Financial Education
Financial education has been a response to the problem of fi nancial 
illiteracy for participants in defi ned contribution systems, both in man-
datory and voluntary defi ned contribution systems (Turner and Muir, 
this volume). The increase in fi nancial education provided by govern-
ments and employers is a direct result of the growing importance of 
defi ned contribution plans as voluntary or mandatory parts of retire-
ment income systems. Financial education can cover such topics as 
investment terminology, asset allocation, risk tolerance, and retirement 
goal setting. Using fi nancial education to address the lack of fi nancial 
literacy of pension participants is not a quick fi x but needs to be a long-
term, sustained, and costly effort.
Several international organizations, such as the OECD and the In-
ternational Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS), have taken an 
interest in fi nancial education for pension participants in individual ac-
count pension systems. In 2008, the OECD created the International 
Network on Financial Education. A survey by IOPS found that 16 out 
of 19 fi nancial supervisors of pension systems provided some type of 
fi nancial education (IOPS 2011). The pension supervisors not providing 
fi nancial education tended to be fairly young, with intentions of provid-
ing fi nancial education in the future. 
Chile, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and the United States have all 
developed fi nancial education programs. In 2009, Colombia enacted a 
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law providing incentives for organizations to establish low-cost pro-
grams for fi nancial education.
Greater Transparency
With some countries moving to defi ned contribution plans, they 
also are leaning toward providing greater transparency, particularly con-
cerning fees. The United States in 2012 released regulations requiring 
greater disclosure to private sector pension participants of information 
concerning fees. Transparency is also an issue in terms of confl icts of 
interest that fi nancial advisers may have. The issue of transparency is 
being considered in a number of other countries, as well. In the UK, pri-
vate pension companies will be forced to reveal fees and charges taken 
from employees’ retirement savings under an agreement with the As-
sociation of British Insurers. The requirement will be implemented in 
2014 for autoenrollment pension plans, and in 2015 for all other work-
place pension plans.
Hybrid Plans
Traditionally, pension plans have been divided into either defi ned 
benefi t plans or defi ned contribution plans, but hybrid plans do not fi t 
neatly into either category. These include defi ned contribution plans 
with rate of return guarantees, such as the Riester plans in Germany. 
Hybrid plans developed in the Netherlands include collective defi ned 
contribution plans, which have a defi ned benefi t plan formula but with 
the workers collectively bearing the investment risk. The most common 
hybrid plan in the United States is the cash balance plan.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has surveyed trends in social security and employer-
provided pensions around the world. Many countries have reformed 
their social security and employer-provided pension systems. Reforms 
of social security programs include raising the benefi t entitlement age, 
adopting automatic adjustment mechanisms, and raising contribution 
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rates. While most countries have retained traditional social insurance–
type social security systems, there have been two other signifi cant trends 
relating to plan type. First, countries with provident funds have been 
converting those funds to social insurance–type social security systems. 
Second, some countries with traditional social security systems have 
added mandatory individual accounts, but more recently a number of 
countries have cut back on the contributions to those accounts. An ad-
ditional trend is that low-income countries have continued to look for 
ways to include more of their workers in their social security systems, 
with some countries adopting innovative programs targeted at groups 
who have not participated in or been covered by social security.
Trends in employer-provided pensions include a shift toward de-
fi ned contributions and away from defi ned benefi t plans, increased use 
of hybrid plans, and a greater usage of unisex mortality tables in calcu-
lating annuities.
Note
We have received valuable comments from Dalmer Hoskins of the U.S. Social Secu-
rity Administration. This chapter draws heavily on the Social Security Administration’s 
monthly newsletter, International Update: Recent Developments in Foreign Public and 
Private Pensions.
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